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It would be a very pleasant thing if, in giving the last words of counsel
that you will hear in any formal way in this place, some plan could be worked
out which would enable each one of you to go straight forward to the goal of
his ambition. Beginning with the inexorable rule of society that every one
is bound to know the law, the student and the lawyer find out year after year
'
that such knowledge seems more and more imperfect. Yet in all common emer
gencies it comes reasonably up to the occasion, and enables most honest and
sensible men to deal safely.
We hear on all sides complaints of the increasing mass of printed Reports
and text-books, which it is said the lawyer must find some means of mastering,
but which no life is long enough to read. The young lawyer, as he scans the
dreary catalogues, and wonders what Croesus can buy or what brain can learn all
this lore, is sorely puzzled what books to choose from the thousands that have
found printers. And when a few years ef practice have shown him how small
a share of these books have done any good in the world, he is forced to consid
er, whether the evil can not in some way be removed. The remedy has not yet
been found, and perhaps may not be, unless some great convulsion should come,
which shall destroy laws altogether. This is not the relief we desire.
It may be that one reason why we find no remedy is because we have no
clear idea of the mischief. And while it may need some greater pressure,
and some intolerable grievance, to make any of us see the true condition of
affairs, I have thought it could do no harm to spend this hour in making some
suggestions on the subject.
The evil is mostly felt in the supposed necessity of attempting to find out
what has been said since the beginning of time by any court in England or
America, upon such questions as arise in practice. To discover this, counsel, by
a legal fiction, are supposed to exhaust all the Digests, and from the brief notes
there found hunt up the many decisians in point. Some able lawyers actually
attempt this at times. Most of them are wise enough to make such long ex
cursions rarely. The voice of the Bar declaies — if not truly with a measure
of truth—that decisions can be found on every side of every question, however
many sided it may be. In this state of things courts and counsel feel called
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upon to determine on which side the weight of opinion lies.
'
Here again there
are two ways of decision. The wiser lawyer, who is willing to reflect on the
principles involved, cares less for the numbers than for the wisdom of the
witnesses. Yet some men, whose ability cannot be denied, aet upon the belief
that the majority of voices should prevail. The diligent student, who traces
up this majority cf decisions to their sources, will often find they all come from
one source. And it sometimes happens that the original decision, on which
they all depend, was misreported, or based on manifest error, and has been
repudiated by the courts of the jurisdiction where it was rendered.
For much, and sometimes for all of the work of research, reliance is placed
on Digests alone, or on the head-notes of the Reporters. But the best of these
useful men may omit important points, or overlook guards and qualifications,
and thus mislead his readers. And the printer or copyist may baffle his skill,
by leaving out or putting in some small word, or by changing one where the wri
ting is not legible, and in that way lay down a legal rule for which no court is
responsible. The maker of Digests perpetuates these blunders, and by similar
mishaps adds to their numbers. These in due time help to make up the weight
of decision ; so that the slip of the printer's journeyman may pass for the wis
dom of learned courts.
Even this does not end the risks. There is a long list of text-books, some
very good and some very bad. In all ages great lawyers have been feund, who
have won fame and gratitude by reducing the principles of law to form and
system, and bringing together in one treatise all that can throw light on the
subjects they have chosen. Where this work has been thoroughly done, their
books are sometimes received as more than substitutes for all the books before
them. The curious reader, who ventures with his moderate learning to seek
out the wisdom of those ancient Englishmen who wrote in that strangest of all
jargons —Law-French, or in Latin that Priscian might have criticised, is
taught a wholesome lesson of humility, as he finds in their almost forgotten
pages the greatest principles set forth so clearly and completely, that none of
their successors have improved upon them. To this day the defenders of civil
liberty, when they speak most forcibly, find themselvc s repeating phrases that
were familiar when the Great Charter was signed, and are much older than
their history. The student who reads what Forteseue, and Finch, and Sir
Thomas Smith have to say about laws and institutions, needs no commentator
to teach him that he has been near the fountains of justice. Yet these in turn
have been displaced by writers who wrote in English, and brought experience
and manly independence into the use of a larger body of hearers. The studies
of twenty fears that Lord Coke says he gave to his Institutes, and the life-long
devotion of that pure and just patriot, Sir Matthew Hale, left no room for much
addition to the knowledge they bestowed on their large subjects. The lawyer
who seeks to glean in the fields they reaped will find little grain ungathered.
But the century between Hale and Blackstone produced very few legal treatises
of permanent value. And until Lord Tenterden wrote his book on Shipping,
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such works as appeared were mostly slavish and clumsy compends, where the
compilers—for they do not deserve the name of authors —made no attempt to
reach legal principles, and seem to have supposed that the law, instead of be
ing a science, was a mere bundle of decisions resting on resemblances. The
only value of their books is in the references to Reports and older writers.
These men, who have gained more fame than they deserve, are largely respon
sible for the increase of mere case-lawyers, — a bigoted and narrow generation
who have done all in their power to retard the natural and wholesome growth
and improvement of jurisprudence. They beguile lazy or hurried counsel into
neglecting even Digests and Reports, and trusting implicitly to their show of
authorities. Edition after edition is issued, each claiming superiority by an
array of some thousands of new citations, until the young lawyer, who is plied
with the publisher's handbills, is persuaded that men who have such industry
must be prodigies of learning. Some of them are ; for authors of merit have
submitted to the craving for cases of their hungry brethren, and waste their
own valuable time in really examining what some legal authorities appear to
bave trusted to their office-boys. It is difficult to magnify the mischief done
by the mob of so-called law books, which, as they are hastily read, seem plau
sible, but which are never of any use when a real controversy arises. No book
can ever help courts or lawyers, unless written by some one who has had much
business experience. The most perfect books are those where principles are
stated so plainly and concisely, that while cases are cited in their support, their
simple statement is their best defence. Of such works America has produced
its full share of the best, and we are continually gaining others. But crowd
ing in with them, and jostling them in public esteem, are much larger numbers
of books, well bound, well printed, and bulky, yet of very little use, where they
are not worse than useless. They are largely written by men of some ability
and a good deal of cramming, whose chief lack is of that practical experience
without which no one can make a useful text-boek. Unfortunately, in glan
cing over such productions, which abound in platitudes and axioms, their de
fects may not be seen udtil some case arises calling for precise doctrine, and
the want of precision only appears when it leads to mischief. They are often
made up of acknowledged and unacknowledged quotations and paraphrases
loosely strung together, and sometimes parade ^stray passages —not always ac
curately given — from foreign law. But their special strength is in the multi
tude of citations, which are added in dozens and scores to fortify the plainest
as well as the most doubtful propositions. These beguile unwary counsel to
insert a cheap and showy filling in their briefs. And it now and then happens
that some unlucky quotation, which cannot be verified in the Reports, leads to
the discovery that the compounder of this miscellany has pilfered most of his
materials ready made, and has borrowed some blunders with them. Citations
which are mistaken in name, or page, or volume, can sometimes be traced back
from book to book for a century, and are found to have been first set down
4 LAW ABRIDGMENT.
wrongly by a slip of the pen, or an uncorrected proof, in the works of some
one who was usually very careful. It is amusing to see how many such blun
ders have been repeated in these pretences of research.
Another common abuse is annotating new books to secure a copyright. It
is difficult to get a reprint which contains no more than the work of its author
as he chose to give it to the public. Original editions are costly and are not
much imported, because reprints would undersell them. But when some
learned and disciplined writer has done his best to present such a clear and
condensed view of the law as rejoices every judicious reader, his modest du
odecimo appears in an American edition in one or more heavy octavos, where
the rivulet of text is choked in a swamp of notes, dreary and pathless, but
swarming with the inevitable citations. Perhaps a quaere is found here and
there, to make people think that in spite of his own intellectual labors the
note maker has found time to look at the book itself.
Very few sensible lawyers care to hunt up a score of authorities upon a
plain proposition, and it is well they do not. The only use of any precedent
is to show the practical recognition of some legal rule, and to define its appli
cation. A single well considered precedent, from a court whose decisions are
of binding authority, is sufficient and conclusive, no matter how other courts
may deal with the subject. In cases where there are no precedents at home
directly in point, the use of foreign authorities concludes nothing. They are
of no use except for the merits of their reasoning. In very many cases the
disagreement among courts is due to local usage or tradition of which the
opinions make no mention, and not to any dispute upon the same principle.
There is always risk in forming a judgment upon any unfamiliar system. The
same language is understood differently in different States and Countries ; and
the implications which control in the interpretation of phrases are seldom
identical, even in the most closely connected communities.
In considering how we can avoid giving some degree of credit to so much
rubbish, we may draw some comfort from the fact that the evil has begun to
cure itself. The natural healing forces always do the best work. As all our
valuable political and legal reforms have worked themselves out with very little
help from philosophical plans, so it may be fairly expected that such evils as
have arisen from our redundant law writings, and the useless attempts to mas
ter them all, will cease, as they have already been checked, when we fully ap
preciate the folly of trying to master them.
This is not the first or the second time when it has become necessary to
rid the law of its burdens. In every instance where the attempt has been
wisely made, it has bsen aimed at getting legal principles defined apart from
their accidental surroundings. In every country, and in all periods, the un
written law, which is the. basis of every system, has been found in natural jus
tice, or deduced from human transactions. To know what is understood as
customary law, we must know what dealings of man with man have been ap
proved or condemned by authority and popular acquiescence. Until the con
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duct of men furnishes a practical test, we can never tell precisely how a theo
retical principle will work. The same difficulty which has always attended
paper schemes of government, which were not the expression of existing insti
tutions organized but not vitally changed, must always attend legal theories
never tried by experience. A system of law built up on precedents is the
safest and best that can be devised.
But the only value of a precedent is in the rule on which it rests. If
that rule is capable of clear verbal definition, its expression will serve all the
purposes of the detailed decision. If it were not for slowness on the one hand,
and subtlety on the other, there would be no need for preserving any more. A
time comes when the rule is so completely defined that it ceases to be argued,
and is treated as an axiom. The mischief of our day, and of a long period be
hind us is that there are some really acute and strong lawyers who never knew
and never will learn that a legal principle can stand alone, and needs no further
aid from the expressed approval of this or that court. If a writer on Geome
try after showing that the square of the hypothenuse of a right-angled triangle
is equal to the squares of the other sides, should fortify his assertion by the
names of all the geometers who have held tkat opinion, he would be laughed
at. Yet that is not a self-evident proposition, and is not as elementary as
some legal rules which often appear in our books with an equally useless train
of corroborating references.
The recognised leaders of the Bar and of the Bench are very generally
becoming convinced of the folly of needless citations; and their arguments and
opinions, except where a different course is plainly called for, seldom undertake
to prop up doctrines that need no support. When they do cite cases, they do
not pick them up at hazard from foot-notes and Digests without examination,
but prove their correctness.
The remedy will be found —when it is found — in some method of obtain
ing a condensed and clear statement of those principles which now have to
be drawn from scattered sources. In several countries this process has been
tried with varied success. We are all interested in turning our attention to it.
The first thing that meets us is the increasing multitude of Reports; and
there are difficulties in dealing with this rapidly growing mass of repetitions.
Reporting is now no more than the publication of the full decisions of courts,
with an editor's synopsis of the heads of the discussion, and sometimes a nar
rative. There is here much room for economising.
Lawyers and courts do not always remember that no tribunal in this
country has any authority to lay down the Common Law for the whole country.
Under the Constitution of the United States the only law deriving authority
from the general government is written law, including the Constitution,
treaties, and valid acts of Congress. The power to lay down Common Law
with authority belongs to each State for itself. The only Reports absolutely
essential in any State are the English originals of the Common Law and of
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Equity the Reports of the United States Supreme Court upon the laws of theUnited States the Reports of the older States-if any-from which localtrisprudence was borrowed and the home Reports. Valuable as any others maybe, they are not of binding authority. The courts of most of our States areconstantly makmg desirable contributions to jurisprudence, and the enlighten!ed lawyer will not overlook them. But a more sparing and discriminating use
t^X^t^f^^ theyare tobe -^«-w*j«*
A crying evil is the legal or practical compulsion put on courts of writingelaborate opinions which sometimes seem to be treatises rather than decisionsOral opinions in the days when they were generally given, were more conciseand much less prone to laying down unnecessary positions. Their value asprecedents was greater, because the immediate connection between facts andresults was more obvious The duty of the Reporter in preserving such opinions compelled hm, i to a judicious combination of clearness and brevity Incases of novelty and peculiar difficulty written opinions would still be preparedand be valued because of the necessity. No doubt all such Reports should berevised by he Judges, to avoid the variances which are sometimes foundamong the old Reporters. But this would not be difficult
Under our usages there are many decisions which might safely be dis
pensed with as precedents. There are, as we all know, rules of right and rulesof remedy. Ru es of right must necessarily be uniform. To a certain extenhe ordinary rules of practice should be uniform. But many practice questions are so far subject to discretion that precedents upon them are misleading
and a slavish reliance on them causes waste of time and expense I„ th
S
State practice questions are not common. If the Bar could be induced everv'where to be liberal, and to rely more upon the rules of court and their own
good sense, the multitude of Practice Reports, which in some States almostoutnumber the decisions on merits, might be consigned to the paper-millwhere they could do no harm. e '
Another source of mischief is found in citing decisions on the admission
and exclusion of evidence Here, again, general principles cannot be too carefully defined; and such rules as are arbitrary must also be familiar But theadmission or rejection of a particular question in a particular ease can seldom
be a guide in any other case, unless it rests on some peculiar ground. LordMansfield who was a most sensible judge, was very liberal in admitting testi
mony ; and in nine cases out ef ten, unless a question strikes a clear headedrial judge as improper he is right in receiving it. There is no branch of thelaw which ought to be kept more free from over-nicety than evidence
Another class of decisions, which most of us like to read, are neverthelessunsafe precedents. In Equity and Admiralty cases, where the facts and thelaw arecombinedin one decision, it is no uncommon thing for men who shouldknow better, to confound conclusions of fact with conclusions of law The




The tendency of all professions is to generalize and classify, without allowance
enough for varying circumstances. All equity lawyers know the difficulty of
getting Courts and the Bar to understand that fraud is usually a question of
fact and not of law. Some Admiralty lawyers regard the finding in a given
case that a vessel should have ported her helm, or gone through some other
nautical manoeuvre, is a crucial test for all other vessels in nearly similar po
sitions, without reference to tides, currents, or other uncertain conditions.
Writers on Criminal Law multiply what they call legal presumptions, and hold
innocent men guilty until they prove their innocence, because in some similar
case a jury has convicted a man who was really guilty. The notion, which is
certainly not a rule of law, that a jury not only may but should convict when
certain ambiguous facts exist, has led to many wrong convictions, and not a
few judicial murders. No finding of fact by court or jury should ever be made
a precedent.
If we could get rid of all reported decisions that do not really settle law
questions, their bulk would be much reduced. The reduction of bulk would
in turn diminish the confusion of facts and law, by bringing the real questions
in every case into plainer view.
Unless a change is made in the material of our Reports, or in the manner
of using them, a resort to some other sources of law in their place can hardly
he avoided. If this is not carried too far it will be a great relief. The com
plex character of our government will necessarily prevent any official codifica
tion of American Law. ,
We have had more or less State Codes of Practice, but these involve no
permanent principle, because one remedy, if convenient, is as good as another.
Any plain method by which substantial justice is reached without delay is good
enough. I make therefore no reference to practice. Statutes arejfor other
reasons beyond control. Our legislation is unstable, and bad laws are very
common. It is fortunate that our legislators have left untouched the substance
of our unwritten law ; for, confused as it is
,
there is some method and order in
it
,
and it can be reduced to system much better in some other way than by
hasty annual or biennial experiments.
We are apt to be deceived by names. Something like the work of Justi
nian—whose name always comes up in this connection, has been done, and well
done, in Common Law countries. But not being done under the direction of
governments, or under formal titles, these labors have not been classed in the
same way.
From such sources of knowledge as are open to those who make no claim
to acquaintance with foreign jurisprudence, enough can be learned to throw
some light on the methods of relief introduced in other countries.
There is a vague idea that the Roman Law was never well defined until
formulated by Justinian. In fact — so far as Europe is concerned —what he
did may almost be regarded as the last dying utterance of the Empire. The
original hold which Roman Law had in that region was taken before he accom
plished his great work. There were codes and institutes before his day, and
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the Theodosian Code was never superseded by lis in some parts of Europe.
In the obscurity of the dark ages it cannot be known how widely his Body of
the Law had been circulated ; but the great rejoicing over a manuscript found at
Amalfi in the 12th century seems to indicate that prior knowledge of it was
largely traditionary. Nevertheless the Corpus Juris of Justinian has repre
sented the Roman Law in modern times as its most complete and authentic
evidence. It was meant to supersede all the old authorities, and, so far as it
operated at all, it generally did so. While there is a great difference of opinion
concerning its merits, it has served as a model for shaping much more recent
jurisprudence. Its p!an, therefore, is suggestive. It contains a collection of
written laws, a Digest of Common Law, and a synopsis of legal principles.
The first part compiled was the Code, which contains the Imperial Consti
tutions, and bears some analogy to a volume of Revised Statutes. The Code
is said by the Civilians to have been very unequal in composition.
The next work was what is commonly known as the Digest or Pandects.
This purports to be a collection of extracts from the opinions and works of
celebrated jurists, on legal questions, combined in a somewhat cumbrous system,
and covering all points considered likely to arise. No attempt was made to
condense or paraphrase. All was in detached quotations. But liberties were
taken with the language; and there is no certainty how much in any given pas
sage was written by Ulpian, Paulus, Gaius, or other old authors, and how much
by Tribonian, who is said to have done most of the altering. He was author
ized by the Emperor to take these liberties, and he never explains what they
were. This work, for which ten years were allowed, was done in three ; and
while it is a valuable mine of judicial knowledge, it is regarded by learned
lawyers as in style and arrangement a very slovenly production. It has some
admirers who as a witty French Commentator declares make a fetish of it.
Some jurists, on the other hand, of whom the learned Hottoman is an example
not only charge Tribonian with dishonesty —which seems to have been his un -
doubted failing—but accuse Justinian and all his company with corrupting and
mutilating the beautiful jurisprudence of Rome, and placing in its stead the
trash of Greeks, Syrians and Africans, and not the genuine opinions of great
Roman sages. But, as the more temperate writers suggest, the middle view is
doubtless the true one. Though Tribonian had only two men of note, Theo-
philus and Dorotheus, among his sixteen assistants, he was himself—as admitted
—very much such a man as Lord Bacon in intellect and learning; and although
venal and dishonest, there was no reason why he should wish to pervert the
laws. The Emperor had unbounded authority, and could make the law to suit
himself. The general spirit of the system is despotic. The real wrong was
in falsifying and changing the words of the old lawyers, so as to make them
sponsors for what they perhaps would not have approved. How far this was
done no one knows. The dispute is not within my present subject.
Although the number of volumes said to have been compressed into the
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Digest is enormous, they must have been rather small treatises, for the new
work is said to contain a twentieth part of the bulk of the originals. Justi
nian forbade the further citation of any previous authorities, and ordained that
no commentaries should be written on the Digest. He expected judges to
decide their causes by using their own good sense in applying the doctrines of
the Code and Digest, and of his Novels, or new Constitutions, whereby he in
troduced some further changes. The Code itself was twice compiled.
The plan wai completed by the Institutes—a compact and well arranged
treatise for the use of students, setting forth the leading rules of the law with
wonderful clearness and brevity. Yet this admirable compend furnishes an
illustration of the insufficiency of very concise maxims for practical guidance.
Even among lawyers — to say nothing of laymen —abstract propositions do not
seem to make sufficiently definite impressions. Rules are not understood
without illustrations, and imaginary illustrations are not as good as real con
troversies. This legal work, which seems a model of clearness, has been more
commented on than any other secular work in existence. In 1701, as Lord
Mackenzie has pointed out, a work was published by a learned German Profes
sor, entitled " On the deplorable multitude of Commentaries on the Institutes."
And, as his lordship remarks, " even in our day the tide has not yet turned, for
hardly a year passes without adding some volumes to the camel's load." Ro
man Laio, 26. In the United States, where no one can have much practical
experience in questions of Roman Law, we have had some contributions to
this literature.
The amount of old law put forever out of the way by the jurisprudence of
Justinian was enormous, and the labor was undertaken to relieve a similar
pressure to that we now complain of. It may be worth remembering that
while the awkward but more practical Digest has not been very extensively
meddled with, the simple and clear synopsis of principles has probably caused
more to be written to explain it than the whole system superseded.
Such treatises as the Institutes have one capital merit which can hardly be
overrated. They give a comprehensive view of all the law with which they
deal, in such a way that the reader sees the mutual relations of the several de
partments. No one can fully comprehend, or rightly value, any system of laws,
until he sees how all interests are regulated. The reasons why breaches of the
law are remedied —one in civil and others in criminal form, sometimes in pro
ceedings ex-contractu and sometimes ex-delicto, sometimes by damages and at
other times by specific redress, now by public, and then by private intervention,
are often supposed to be capricious and arbitrary, when in faet these matters
have shaped themselves more wisely than any theoretical scheme could plan
them. No one conceives how one interest afiects every other until he sees them
all together. Those great men who have been permanent founders of juris
prudence, such as Coke, Hale, Mansfield, Hardwicke and Marshall, never seem,
when dealing with one subject, to have lost sight of the rest ; and their rea
soning and its force can never become obsolete.
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The difficulties we have to deal with belong more especially to Customary
Law Countries, where the foundation of the law rests on usage and precedents,
and where the written law is construed with the aid of the unwritten. With
some difference in circumstances, there has been much similar experience in
England and France, and remedies have been attempted in both.
Without dwelling on uncertain antiquity, the first accessible decisions on
the customs of the realm of England are generally understood to be the Year
Books. The old private treatises do not deal much in proofs and illustrations.
The fact that no one, who is not a little pedantic, indulges much in citations
from these ancient Reports, shows that some substitute has been found for them.
The earliest compends were once called Abridgments, but are now better
known as Digests. Some of them group together all the decisions on one point
with a single statement, while others repeat them. But all gather the law
under alphabetical heads. It was not systematised otherwise.
The earliest work which is still authority, that deserves the name of a
scientific law book, is Littleton's Tenures. The greatest lawyers in England
and France place it in the foremost rank of law literature. It is quite as
concise as the Institutes, and more practical. It is quoted with as much re
spect by the French commentators on Customary Law as in Westminster Hall.
And it became the end of the Law. No one went behind it for authority.
Most English property law related to land, and this book contained its essence.
Another source of legal knowledge, not found in the early Reports, has not
been given as much weight by the English writers as by those of the Continent.
The French jurists reckon the municipal charters, and the recognition or estab
lishment of customs under them, as the first and not least important among the
codes. The student of English Law will not find much light on these in the
Reports. But the English cities and boroughs were for many centuries the
freest and best governed parts of the kingdom. Their customs were known
and settled. Their civic usages and regulations furnished patterns for much of
our best American legislation, and have moulded a great deal of English law.
The Law Merchant grew up almost entirely from their commercial systems.
The Sea Laws have also been codified for many centuries. While it can -
not be said that any »f those codes had the force of law in England or Amer
ica, the comparative uniformity and permanency of maritime regulations is
largely due to them.
The publication of Coke's Commentary on Littleton is another era. His
remaining Institutes have been mostly superseded. But his first Institute
has been universally regarded as complete and exhaustive. It is honor enough
for any lawyer to be annotated by two such learned lawyers and elegant schol
ars as Francis Hargrave and Charles Butler, who introduced him to this cen
tury. It is safe to take him as a starting point. In the large libraries which
contain all the Reports behind his time, the dust is apt to gather on them,
without much harm to the law.
In the early days of James I.
,
Henry Finch wrote his Nomotechnia, or
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Description of the Laws of England, which in its English version served as a
text book for students until superseded by Blaokstone. It is a complete view
of the Common Law, clearly and philosophically arranged, with profound learn
ing and scientific accuracy. The fact that such a book may cease to be needed,
shows that the sages of the law have not disappeared.
The Criminal Law text-books have very generally and satisfactorily su
perseded the old Reports.
The invaluable Commentaries of Blackstone, written just as the American
Colonies were about to make considerable departures from English law, and
become independent, have in both countries been relied on almost impli
citly as a complete view of the Common Law of that period. The omissions
and errors are too few to lessen their value.
Pausing at this period, we see that without government influence, wise
lawyers, observant of events and guided by practical experience, have from time
to time enabled their contemporaries, without shock or change of system, to
dispense for most purposes with most of the books that preceded them.
The experience of another Customary Law country —France — is still more
instructive. Whether, as some writers claim, the French Customary Law owes
much to Roman Law, or whether, as some of her great jurists insist, its mix
ture of Roman Law is small, it is not worth while now to discuss, if I had—as
I have not—any sufficient knowledge to do so. Whatever may have been its
sources, it passed through various stages from unwritten to written systems, and
at last became so well arranged by the Code Napoleon, that its later modifica
tions have required no great labor.
Until very recently France was divided into the country of the written
law, and the country of the customary law. The written or Roman Law was
the basis of the laws of the southern provinces, where Roman colonies had
been long established, and Roman institutions thoroughly settled. But the
North part of the Kingdom, which was chiefly settled by people who were very
tenacious of their own customs, continued until the Revolution to be governed
by what was originally unwritten customary law.
For many centuries the Provinces were the real seats of power, and con
tained all the important courts of justice; and there was nothing to interfere
with their practical judicial independence. In these provincial courts, while
our jury system did not exist, there was nevertheless in most cases a similar
safeguard in lay assessors.
When the central power began to gain strength, and causes went up to
Paris from the Provinces, the judges found it impossible to inform themselves
concerning the local law. More than one King meditated the establishment of
a National Code. While this was among the dreams of ambitious monarchs,
it was not regarded as practicable. But it was thought feasible to collate the
customary law of each province, and possibly this may have been regarded as a
step towards our system. England, which had been very intimately connected
with France, had succeeded in fusing together many Norman customs with
'
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those of its seven kingdoms ; and, except in a few places, its Common Law was
uniform, — save for some local customs which did not prevent a general agree -
ment. Its cities and boroughs retained their own usages. But England had
never been so divided as France.
There had been several collations of law which had made this idea famil
iar. The early Capitularies were not new royal ordinances. They were chiefly
based on customs, and had they not been they would not have been obeyed.
The Salique Laws and other ancient written systems are regarded by the French
law-writers as purely customary. Charles the Bald, in 864, recognised by edict
the exemption of the larger part of his realm from Roman Law. Godfrey's
Assises of Jerusalem were based on customary law.
The early customs were more uniform than the later. Changes grew up
in the provinces under different feudal rulers, very much as the common law
of the American colonies and States, with a general resemblance, has become
changed by local interests. Bollo and the Normans made important variations.
The traditions of Normandy honor him as a wise and good governor.
The great diversity among these customs made the work of compiling them
very tedious. Royal ordinances were passed by Charles VII, in 1453, providing
that all the customs should be reduced to writing and ascertained by competent
persons in each region, and settled in the general assembly of each province,
where representatives of the clergy, nobility and burgesses, from every part
of the province, were to be summoned to aid in determining them. The first
custom ascertained was not completed until 1495. Others were completed
from time to time during the next century, The Custom of Normandy was
not ratified until 1585. There had been two or more older collections of these
customs of Normandy, and the Norman customs introduced into England by
William the Conqueror are supposed by Basnage to have been the same estab
lished by Rollo.
The method of ascertaining these customs was very good. Every one
who knew of any custom or maxim, produced it in the common assembly gath
ered for the purpose. The old written customs were preserved in the original
language, where they had not been changed. Every rule on which opinions
differed was discussed and verified. Some were found to be general, others
local. Each was set down in the class to which it belonged. They were all
condensed into brief and pithy rules easily remembered, and most of them had
probably been handed down in such forms. Many would be recognised by any
one as popular proverbs — some of which have become current without their
legal origin being suspected.
Such proverbs are not unknown in English law. The Kentish saw—" the
father to the bough, the son to the plough," —expresses very tersely the immu
nity of gavelkind lands from forfeiture for crime. Some maxims seem to ap
ply to economy rather than law, and are shrewd and caustic. Poor Richard's
rules as to borrowing and lending, and kindred subjects, might perhaps be traced
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to some such source. A maxim that gold is worth what is worth gold, is a very
neat expression of financial doctrine.
The commentators have sometimes complained that the language of these
collections is uncouth and obsolete. Among the more thoughtful this is reckon
ed a merit, as enabling the era of each rule to be discovered. Some, which
are in comparatively modern form, were evidently either framed or revised when
the collation was made. Others belong to the oldest known dialects of the
provinces.
All of these several customs soon found commentators not inferior to
Coke, who was the cotemporary of some of the most celebrated, and who was
no doubt familiar with the proceedings in Normandy. Both Coke and Little
ton are referred to—the latter as original authority, on customary law. It is
disputed on some points whether England or Normandy borrowed from the other
certain rules of property.
When the work was done, it appeared that there were about sixty general,
and three hundred local, bodies of customs.
But before this work had been commenced under Charles VII, some of the
enlightened lawyers of France, and none are more enlightened, had discovered
what they called a certain family air among these numerous customs.
It was an acknowledged doctrine that no body of customs could be enfor
ced which had not been approved by the representative estates of the province.
And while a very large power remained in the local sovereigns and lords, there
was no such thing recognized as absolute power in them or in the King. In
forfeitures for felony, which was deemed an offence against allegiance, the lord as
well as the vassal forfeited his right when he failed in his own duty. It is said
by the jurists,—who are better authority than some flippant historians, that the
little principality of Yvetot became freed from the direct sovereignty of the
crown of France, by forfeiture for felony committed by King Clothaire in mur
dering the feudal lord, whose heirs became thereby vested with palatine rights
and free from the usual royal burdens. Ferriere, who wrote in the middle of
the last century, and who is one of the best authorities on French law, gives
this explanation of what he mentions as undoubted; and the King of Yvetot
is spoken of in Monstrelet as a personage of some note. This little realm, al
though Beranger has made it hard to speak soberly of it
,
was probably as im
portant in its day as the Kingdom of Man, or the Channel Islands, or Monaco,
all of which are still in legal effect distinct realms.
There was no trace in the customary law of the family and marital despot
ism which was so prominent in Roman law ; and the law of tenures was equal
ly distinct. The comparison of customs made it evident that, with many differ
ences, there were many important common provisions, mostly dating back to the
more uniform usages of the Franks, although in some respects belonging to
more recent feudal regulations.
But this uniformity was not absolutely determined for a long time. Had
not the general revision taken place, it weuld perhaps have been very much
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longer before any common system was worked out. But finally, instead of re
sorting to the Roman Law in cases not covered by a particular custom, resort
was had to the customs generally prevalent ; and according to some writers the
Custom of Paris was regarded as a proper guide where no other more general
rule was to be found.
It may interest us to know that for more than a century the Custom of
Paris was the Common Law of Michigan, and, prior to the assumption of pos
session under Jay's Treaty of 1794, nearly all of our contracts and transactions
were framed in accordance with it. Had the population been more i.umerous
we might have remained under the same system with Louisiana, which was
once under the same control, and whose first Governor, LaMotte Cadillac, left
his Seigneurie at Detroit to assume his new functions.
The reduction of the common principles of customary law to one general
system occupied at the same time the attention of three very distinguished
jurists of the 16th century, Charles DuMoulin, Suy Coquille, and Antoine
Loysel. DuMoulin, who died in 1566, is said by Dupin and Laboulaye to
have had more influence than any one else on the development of French juris
prudence. He wrote a series of notes on all the customs, with the express view
of preparing the way for a general system. Coquille, who prepared a commen
tary on the customs of Nivernais, was led by his researches on that subject to
the preparation of a work called Institutions of French Law, in which the bo
dy of customs was reviewed, and a general scheme explained. But his friend
Loysel seems entitled to the credit of giving completeness and order to the
plan which the others had less sharply defined. He and they were practised
jurists and accomplished scholars, versed in liberal arts and masters of all the
knowledge of Roman Law. Loysel was the favorite pupil and companion of
the great civilian Cujas, and well fitted by breadth and precision of learning
for the work he accomplished. He spent his leisure for forty years in com
paring the multitude of customs prevailing through France, and deduced from
them nine hundred and nineteen rules, which were classified in six books, each
divided into several titles. In addressing this collection to his sons, he explained
to them that he had taken each rule as he found it
,
preserving the original
words and expressions, and making no avoidable changes; and that he had spent
all this labor to procure their ultimate union in one single law and custom o
f
the kingdom. He first published it as an appendix to an edition of Coquille's
work, then under the editorial charge of his son-in-law. These rules thus
classified he entitled "Customary Institutes, or a Manual of many and diverse
rules, sentences and proverbs, both ancient and modern, of the Customary
and most ordinary Law of France."
This work at once attracted attention, and was studied and annotated by
various lawyers. The most important notes and illustrations were those o
f
Eusebe dc Lauriere, an associate in the labors of D'Aguesseau, who has left be
hind him several important works, of which his edition of Loysel, published in
1710, although not a large book, is considered as the most valuable. Several
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editions of this were published during the last century, the best of which is
said to have been that of 1783, edited by Jean Baptiste Bonhomme his son-in-
law, and enriched by notes found among his papers after his death.
This impression had become very rare ; and, in 1843, Mr. Dupin having
announced that he had a new one in preparation, Mr. Edward Laboulaye, who
was also engaged in a similar project, united with him, and by their joint labors
they have produced an edition worthy of the reputation of two of the most
eminent men of our day. They have enriched it not only with legal illustra
tions drawn from all sources, but also with references to the old chronicles and
poets, where many passages are found explaining both words and customs. They
have also added a Glossary of obsolete language. It is curious that for the
meaning of many words they have had recourse to the English law dictionaries,
where the old Norman French has been preserved more carefully than in the
modernised dictionaries of France. The tendency of emigrants to retain lan
guage free from the capricious changes it undergoes in the mother country,
might be further shown by the preservation in our own vernacular of old En-
lish that has puzzled British antiquaries, and by the currency in Canada of
many of the phrases in this Glossary.
When Napoleon conceived and completed his plan of framing a code of
French law, he was not compelled, as has been sometimes imagined, to look to
Justinian as his model, nor to compose a system out of legal chaos. In addi
tion to several systematic ordinances, of which the Marine Ordinance of Louis
XIV is a remarkable specimen, he had not only the annotated books of customs,
but the admirable works of DuMoulin, Coquille and Loysel, and their succes
sors, to aid him in his great undertaking. The best commentators on the Code
Napoleon, and its later modifications, are very emphatic in repudiating any but
a customary origin to its chief provisions. Napoleon justly regarded this as
his best gift to France. That accomplished scholar and lawyer, Charles Butler,
has called attention to the fact, that, in the discussions during its preparation, all
the magistrates and jurists who aided in it were treated by the Emperor as
equals, and that his suggestions not only showed a complete knowledge of the
subject, but were inferior in value to none, and always inclined to liberal and
humane views.
Mr. Butler has noticed, what has some times escaped attention, that the
French courts and writers have always been sparing in the use of precedents.
Napoleon provided expressly that thenceforward no court should attempt to
lay down rules for future cases. This necessarily rendered citations useless,
and they are now seldom found in the text books. The Code is the only source
of authority for legal decisions.
The same gentleman has mentioned a very good reason for dispensing with
precedents. Writing in 1822, he says that while there were but four Superior
Courts in England, with fifteen Judges, France then had six hundred Courts
and five thousand six hundred Judges. They might well beware of precedents
if all these courts were to make them. That seems a prodigious number of
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tribunals. But if any one will count up the number of State and United
States Courts, of original and appellate jurisdiction, whose decisions appear in
volumes or periodicals, — to say nothing of the able tribunals in Canada, and the
British Courts, civil and criminal, he will find the American lawyer who desires
to exhaust the precedents has a list much larger than he thinks, and will dis
cover the necessity of confining his researches within reasonable bounds.
The condensation and simplification of the law, both in England and France,
have chiefly come from private and not public undertakings. Whenever the
right man has done the work, it has made reference to previous precedents gen
erally needless, unless in rare and peculiar cases. And those very men, while
they base all their doctrines on established law and inferences from it
,
seldom
overload their own pages with citations, but choose them with great care.
We may, therefore, fairly expect that here, as elsewhere, the remedy will
be found in the labors of sound writers, who will do what they can to set forth
in order the principles ef the law, and not leave their readers to grope among
chaotic quotations or pointless platitudes. We have no reason to be ashamed
of our authors, although we have had some miserable compilers. Our special
treatises are often elegant and thorough. Upon a wider field of law, the com
mentaries of Chancellor Kent need not be named as second in merit to any law
book in existence.
The greatest blemish in many of our books is their indiscriminate multiplica
tion of cases. No doubt there is a demand for this, but it is an unhealthy cra
ving, and those who are to guide the student to a knowledge of the law should
not be afraid to refuse him this poor sustenance. Nothing else will stop the
increase of those stupid productions, which have nothing valuable in them that
did not come from some one else than the collector, and yet whose enormous
lists of citations, useless as they are, lend them a semblance of learning. When
it is once understood that a book should derive its value from the author's text,
and'not from any footnotes which have no ideas in them, our libraries may be
smaller, but they will be better.
It is pleasant to- note that the jurists who have succeeded in writing works
which have made new eras in jurisprudence, have been not only skilled in the
law, but wise and patient, of cool judgment and patriotic devotion. Most of
them have been learned and accomplished in other ways. And when we reflect
how important public spirit and integrity of thought and action are to every
commonwealth, we have no reason to regret that some men of great intellect,
who have left their mark in other fields of thought, have made very little im
pression upon the law.
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